1.1.6 The second notion of validity is proof-theoretic. Validity is defined in terms of some purely formal procedure (that is, one that makes reference only to the symbols of the inference). We use the metalinguistic symbol ' ' for this notion of validity. In our case, this procedure will (mainly) be one employing tableaux. What distinguish different logics here are the different tableau procedures employed.
1.1.7 Most contemporary logicians would take the semantic notion of validity to be more fundamental than the proof-theoretic one, though the matter is certainly debatable. However, given a semantic notion of validity, it is always useful to have a proof-theoretic notion that corresponds to it, in the sense that the two definitions always give the same answers. If every proof-theoretically valid inference is semantically valid (so that entails |=) the proof-theory is said to be sound. If every semantically valid inference is proof-theoretically valid (so that |= entails ) the proof-theory is said to be complete. simply as A ⊃ (B ∨ ¬C). Upper-case Greek letters, , , . . . , represent arbitrary sets of formulas; the empty set, however, is denoted by the (lower case) φ, in the standard way. I often write a finite set, {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n }, simply as A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n .
The Syntax of the Object Language

Semantic Validity
1.3.1 An interpretation of the language is a function, ν, which assigns to each propositional parameter either 1 (true), or 0 (false). Thus, we write things such as ν(p) = 1 and ν(q) = 0.
1.3.2 Given an interpretation of the language, ν, this is extended to a function that assigns every formula a truth value, by the following recursive clauses, which mirror the syntactic recursive clauses: 2 ν(¬A) = 1 if ν(A) = 0, and 0 otherwise. 1.3.3 Let be any set of formulas (the premises); then A (the conclusion) is a semantic consequence of ( |= A) iff there is no interpretation that makes all the members of true and A false, that is, every interpretation that makes all the members of true makes A true. ' |= A' means that it is not the case that |= A.
1.3.4
A is a logical truth (tautology) (|= A) iff it is a semantic consequence of the empty set of premises (φ |= A), that is, every interpretation makes A true.
2 The reader might be more familiar with the information contained in these clauses when it is depicted in the form of a with a single branch at whose nodes occur the premises (if there are any) and the negation of the conclusion. We will call this the initial list. We then apply rules which allow us to extend this branch. The rules for the conditional are as follows:
The rule on the right is to be interpreted as follows. If we have a formula ¬(A ⊃ B) at a node, then every branch that goes through that node is extended with two further nodes, one for A and one for ¬B. The rule on the left is interpreted similarly: if we have a formula A ⊃ B at a node, then every branch that goes through that node is split at its tip into two branches;
one contains a node for ¬A; the other contains a node for B.
3 Strictly speaking, for those who want the precise mathematical definition, it is a partial order with a unique maximum element, x 0 , such that for any element, x n , there is a unique finite chain of elements
1.4.3 For example, to test the inference whose premises are A ⊃ B, B ⊃ C, and whose conclusion is A ⊃ C, we construct the following tree:
The first three formulas are the premises and negated conclusion. The next two formulas are produced by the rule for the negated conditional applied to the negated conclusion; the first split on the branch is produced by applying the rule for the conditional to the first premise; the next splits are produced by applying the same rule to the second premise. (Ignore the '×'s: we will come back to those in a moment.)
1.4.4 The other connectives also have rules, which are as follows.
Intuitively, what a tableau means is the following. If we apply a rule to a formula, then if that formula is true in an interpretation, so are the formulas below on at least one of the branches that the rule generates. (Of course, there may be only one such branch.) This is a useful mnemonic for remembering the rules. It must be stressed, though, that officially the rules are purely formal.
1.4.5 A tableau is complete iff every rule that can be applied has been applied.
By applying the rules over and over, we may always construct a complete tableau. In the present case, the branches of a completed tableau are always finite, 4 but in the tableaux of some subsequent chapters they may be infinite. 
we omit arrows where a branch does not divide.
Note that when we find a contradiction on a branch, there is no point in continuing it further. We know that the branch is going to close, whatever else is added to it. Hence, we need not bother to extend a branch as soon as it is found to close. Notice also that, wherever possible, we apply rules that do not split branches before rules that split branches. Though this is not essential, it keeps the tableau simpler, and is therefore useful practically.
1.4.9 In practice, it is also a useful idea to put a tick at the side of a formula once one has applied a rule to it. Then one knows that one can forget about it.
5 There may, in fact, be several completed trees for an inference, depending upon the order of the premises in the initial list and the order in which rules are applied. Fortunately, they all give the same result, though this is not entirely obvious. See 1.14, problem 5.
Introduction
7.1.1 In this chapter, we leave possible-world semantics for a time, and turn to the subject of propositional many-valued logics. These are logics in which there are more than two truth values.
7.1.2 We have a look at the general structure of a many-valued logic, and some simple but important examples of many-valued logics. The treatment will be purely semantic: we do not look at tableaux for the logics, nor at any other form of proof procedure. Tableaux for some many-valued logics will emerge in the next chapter.
7.1.3 We also look at some of the philosophical issues that have motivated many-valued logics, how many-valuedness affects the issue of the conditional, and a few other noteworthy issues. An interpretation is extended to a map from all formulas into V by applying the appropriate truth functions recursively. Thus, for example,
Many-valued
ν(¬(p∧q)) = f ¬ (ν(p ∧ q)) = f ¬ (f ∧ (ν(p), ν(q))). (So if ν(p) = 1 and ν(q) = 0, ν(¬(p ∧ q)) = f ¬ (f ∧ (1, 0)) = f ¬ (0) = 1.) Finally,
an inference is semantically valid just if
there is no interpretation that assigns all the premises a value in D, but assigns the conclusion a value not in D. Thus, if c is an n-place connective, f c is an n-place function with inputs and outputs in V.
A many-valued logic is
7.2.5 An interpretation for the language is a map, ν, from propositional parameters into V. This is extended to a map from all formulas of the language to V by applying the appropriate truth functions recursively. Thus,
A is a logical truth iff φ |= A, i.e., iff for every interpretation
7.2.6 If V is finite, the logic is said to be finitely many-valued. If V has n members, it is said to be an n-valued logic.
7.2.7 For any finitely many-valued logic, the validity of an inference with finitely many premises can be determined, as in the classical propositional calculus, simply by considering all the possible cases. We list all the possible combinations of truth values for the propositional parameters employed.
Then, for each combination, we compute the value of each premise and the conclusion. If, in any of these, the premises are all designated and the conclusion is not, the inference is invalid. Otherwise, it is valid. We will have an example of this procedure in the next section. 
In the last three columns, the first number is the value of ¬q; the last number is that of ¬p, and the central number (printed in bold) is the value of the whole formula. As can be seen, there is no interpretation where the premise is designated, that is, has the value 1, and the conclusion is not.
7.3.6 In checking for validity, it may well be easier to work backwards.
Consider the formula p ⊃ (q ⊃ p). Suppose that this is undesignated. Then it has either the value 0 or the value i. If it has the value 0, then p has the value 1 and q ⊃ p has the value 0. But if p has the value 1, so does q ⊃ p.
This situation is therefore impossible. If it has the value i, there are three possibilities:
The first case is not possible, since if p has the value 1, so does q ⊃ p. Nor is the last case, since if p has the value i, q ⊃ p has value either i or 1. But the second case is possible, namely when both p and q have the value i. Thus, Connections between FDE and the many-valued logics of the last chapter will emerge.
Many-valued Logics and Conditionals
8.1.2
We also look at an alternative possible-world semantics for FDE, which will introduce us to a new kind of semantics for negation.
8.1.3 Finally, we look at the relation of all this to the explosion of contradictions, and to the disjunctive syllogism.
The Semantics of FDE
The language of FDE contains just the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬. A ⊃ B
is defined, as usual, as ¬A ∨ B.
In the classical propositional calculus, an interpretation is a function
from formulas to the truth values 0 and 1, written thus: ν(A) = 1 (or 0).
Packed into this formalism is the assumption (usually made without comment in elementary logic texts) that every formula is either true or false; never neither, and never both.
8.2.3
As we saw in the last chapter, there are reasons to doubt this assumption. If one does, it is natural to formulate an interpretation, not as a function, but as a relation between formulas and truth values. Thus, a formula may relate to 1; it may relate to 0; it may relate to both; or it may relate to neither. This is the main idea behind the following semantics for FDE.
Note that it is now very important to distinguish between being false
in an interpretation and not being true in it. (There is, of course, no difference in the classical case.) The fact that a formula is false (relates to 0) does not mean that it is untrue (it may also relate to 1). And the fact that it is untrue (does not relate to 1) does not mean that it is false (it may not relate to 0 either).
8.2.5
An FDE interpretation is a relation, ρ 1 between propositional parameters and the values 1 and 0. (In mathematical notation, ρ ⊆ P ×{1, 0}, where P is the set of propositional parameters.) Thus, pρ1 means that p relates to 1, and pρ0 means that p relates to 0.
Given an interpretation, ρ, this is extended to a relation between all formulas and truth values by the recursive clauses:
A ∧ Bρ1 iff Aρ1 and Bρ1
A ∨ Bρ0 iff Aρ0 and Bρ0
Note that these are exactly the same as the classical truth conditions, stripped of the assumption that truth and falsity are exclusive and exhaustive. Thus, a conjunction is true (under an interpretation) if both conjuncts are true (under that interpretation); it is false if at least one conjunct is false, etc.
8.2.7
As an example of how these conditions work, consider the formula ¬p ∧ (q ∨ r). Suppose that pρ1, pρ0, qρ1 and rρ0, and that ρ relates no parameter to anything else. Since p is true, ¬p is false; and since p is false, ¬p is true. Thus ¬p is both true and false. Since q is true, q ∨ r is true; and since q is not false, q ∨ r is not false. Thus, q ∨ r is simply true. But then, ¬p ∧ (q ∨ r) is true, since both conjuncts are true;
and false, since the first conjunct is false. That is, ¬p ∧ (q ∨ r)ρ1 and For every parameter, p, if there is a node of the form p, +, set pρ1; if there is a node of the form ¬p, +, set pρ0. No other facts about ρ obtain.
8.3.9 Thus, the counter-model defined by the righthand branch of the tableau in 8.3.7 is the interpretation ρ, where pρ1 and qρ0 (and no other relations hold). It is easy to check directly that this interpretation makes the premises true and the conclusion untrue.
8.3.10 The tableaux are sound and complete with respect to the semantics. This is proved in 8.7.1-8.7.7. 
FDE and Many-valued Logics
The conjunction of any two elements, x and y, is their greatest lower bound, that is, the greatest thing from which one can get to both x and y going up Exhaustion: for all p, either pρ1 or pρ0
i.e., every propositional parameter is either true or false -and maybe both. Then it is not difficult to check that, again, the same holds for every sentence, A. 4 That is, nothing takes the value n.
3 Proof: The proof is by an induction over the complexity of sentences. Suppose that it is true for A and B; we show that it is true for ¬A, A ∧ B and A ∨ B. Suppose that ¬Aρ1 and ¬Aρ0; then Aρ0 and Aρ1, contrary to supposition. Suppose that A ∧ Bρ1 and A ∧ Bρ0; then Aρ1 and Bρ1, and either Aρ0 or Bρ0; hence, either Aρ1 and Aρ0, or the same for B.
Both cases are false, by assumption. The argument for A ∨ B is similar. 4 Proof: The proof is by an induction over the complexity of sentences. Suppose that it is true for A and B; we show that it is true for ¬A, A ∧ B and A ∨ B. Suppose that either Aρ1 or Aρ0; then either ¬Aρ0 or ¬Aρ1. Since Aρ1 or Aρ0, and Bρ1 or Bρ0, then either Aρ1 and Bρ1, and so A ∧ Bρ1; or Aρ0 or Bρ0, and so A ∧ Bρ0. The argument for A ∨ B is similar. should have a third. This is a two-valued possible-world semantics, which treats negation as an intensional operator; that is, as an operator whose truth conditions require reference to worlds other than the world at which truth is being evaluated.
8.5.2 Specifically, we assume that each world, w, comes with a mate, w * , its star world, such that ¬A is true at w if A is false, not at w, but at w * . If w = w * (which may happen), then these conditions just collapse into the classical conditions for negation; but if not, they do not. The star operator is often described with a variety of metaphors; for example, it is sometimes described as a reversal operator; but it is hard to give it and its role in the truth conditions for negation a satisfying intuitive interpretation.
8.5.3 Formally, a Routley interpretation is a structure W , * , ν, where W is a set of worlds, * is a function from worlds to worlds such that w * * = w, and ν assigns each propositional parameter either the value 1 or the value 0 at each world. ν is extended to an assignment of truth values for all formulas by the conditions: 
